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Unanimous Implementation: A Case for Approval Mechanisms
Author(s) -
Matías Núñez,
Dimitrios Xefteris
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2728337
Subject(s) - outcome (game theory) , condorcet method , mechanism design , mechanism (biology) , social choice theory , welfare , domain (mathematical analysis) , class (philosophy) , coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) , social welfare , mathematical economics , computer science , microeconomics , economics , actuarial science , law and economics , political science , mathematics , law , artificial intelligence , statistics , voting , mathematical analysis , philosophy , epistemology , politics

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