z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
The Comparative Political Economy Basel III in Europe
Author(s) -
David Howarth,
Lucia Quaglia
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2630555
Subject(s) - basel iii , basel ii , economics , politics , risk weighted asset , financial system , economic system , economy , political science , market economy , capital requirement , financial capital , law , incentive , human capital , capital formation
The Basel III Accord was the centerpiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in Europe – Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators faced a ‘trilemma’ in setting capital requirements, having to prioritize among banking sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. Different varieties of national financial system – specifically, banking system and different kinds of ‘banking champions’ – explain the different prioritization of objectives in the ‘trilemma’ and hence for the divergent preferences of national regulators on Basel III capital requirements.Intermediate version 2015/07/07; Final version: University of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper 2015/19; Europa Institute Working Paper 2015/0

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom