Conservatism and Liquidity Traps
Author(s) -
Taisuke Nakata,
Sebastian Schmidt
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2544627
Subject(s) - conservatism , market liquidity , liquidity trap , business , economics , financial system , monetary economics , political science , liquidity risk , law , politics
In an economy with an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off for discretionary central banks between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. Appointing Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB and enhances welfare by improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB.
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