An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility | Zendy

Alfred Galichon | Zendy; Scott Duke Kominers | Zendy; Simon Weber | Zendy

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An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Author(s) -

Alfred Galichon,

Scott Duke Kominers,

Simon Weber

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

ssrn electronic journal

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

ISSN - 1556-5068

DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2535394

Subject(s) - transferable utility , matching (statistics) , uniqueness , mixed logit , class (philosophy) , logit , mathematical economics , simple (philosophy) , econometrics , discrete choice , economics , computer science , mathematical optimization , mathematics , game theory , logistic regression , statistics , mathematical analysis , philosophy , epistemology , machine learning , artificial intelligence

We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We characterize equilibrium and conditions for identification, and derive comparative statics.

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