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Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games
Author(s) -
John H. Kagel,
Peter McGee
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2317147
Subject(s) - prisoner's dilemma , dilemma , mathematical economics , repeated game , psychology , social psychology , economics , mathematics , game theory , geometry

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