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The Value of Lies in an Ultimatum Game with Imperfect Information
Author(s) -
Damien Besancenot,
Delphine Dubart,
Radu Vranceanu
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2312320
Subject(s) - ultimatum game , imperfect , perfect information , value (mathematics) , mathematical economics , economics , computer science , psychology , microeconomics , philosophy , linguistics , machine learning

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