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Reputations in Repeated Games
Author(s) -
George J. Mailath,
Larry Samuelson
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2286763
Subject(s) - repeated game , mathematical economics , mathematics , computer science , game theory
This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

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