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Dynamics of Provision of Threshold Public Goods
Author(s) -
Arnaud Dragicevic,
Jim Engle-Warnick
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - French
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.1919154
Subject(s) - public good , dynamics (music) , business , economics , microeconomics , sociology , pedagogy
Agents face an ambiguous risk of biodiversity survival as well as ambiguous expected losses from its extinction. As a collectivity, agents are faced with the option of privately funding the protection of biodiversity for biomedical research. We propose two evolutionary models of threshold public goods game and public goods option market, where we consider population dynamics with proportional fair-share contributors versus free-riders. In the first model, we find that agents contribute both in null and ambiguous survival scenarios. In the second model, in case of ambiguous survival, the public good is provided when the agents exchanging option contracts are equally divided into buyers and sellers. This result holds for a specific market belief over the species survival. However, the absence of surplus captured on the option market condemns its raison d'etre. Low risk will provoke unconditional social free-riding in both models. Les agents font face a un risque ambigu quant a la survie de la biodiversite ainsi qu'a des pertes esperees ambigues de par leur extinction. En tant que collectivite, les agents ont la possibilite de financer, a titre prive, la protection de la biodiversite a des fins de recherche biomedicale. Nous proposons deux modeles evolutionnaires de jeu du bien public avec seuil et de marche des options sur bien public, ou nous considerons la dynamique des populations composees de contributeurs a hauteur de leur juste part proportionnelle et de passagers clandestins. Dans le premier modele, nos resultats montrent que les agents contribuent aussi bien dans les scenarios de survie nulle que de survie ambigue. Dans le second modele, le bien public est fourni lorsque les agents negociant les contrats d'options sont identiquement divises entre acheteurs et vendeurs. Ce resultat se verifie pour une croyance specifique du marche sur la survie des especes. Neanmoins, l'absence de surplus capte sur le marche des options condamne sa raison d'etre. Un risque faible provoquera un comportement de passager clandestin inconditionnel dans les deux modeles.

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