Open AccessWeak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions
Author(s) -
Charles Figuieres,
David Masclet,
Marc Willinger
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.1752249
Subject(s) - persistence (discontinuity) , internalism and externalism , turnover , intrinsic motivation , ideal (ethics) , social psychology , psychology , positive economics , economics , epistemology , philosophy , geotechnical engineering , management , engineering
Under the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents, average voluntary contributions decline with repetition of the game, provided that the aggregate moral motivation cannot increase. Our model is compatible with the conditional cooperation hypothesis.
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