Call Auctions with Contingent Orders
Author(s) -
Serkan İmişiker,
Isa E. Hafalir
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.1750582
Subject(s) - common value auction , business , economics , microeconomics
We introduce a new mechanism for call auctions which are widely used in stock exchanges. By incorporating contingent claims (buy stock A, if selling stock B) into the price discovery process, we achieve a higher liquidity in call auctions and lower volatility after opening call auctions. We also show that present call auctions and the proposed mechanism have similar incentive properties.
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