Open AccessComment on Cavalcanti and Nosal's 'Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design'
Author(s) -
Cyril Monnet
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.1680888
Subject(s) - economics , mechanism (biology) , mathematical economics , mechanism design , law and economics , neoclassical economics , monetary economics , philosophy , epistemology
In this comment, the author extends Cavalcanti and Nosal's (2010) framework to include the case of perfectly divisible money and unrestricted money holdings. He shows that when trade takes place in Walrasian markets, counterfeits circulate and the Friedman rule is still optimal.
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