Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence
Author(s) -
Jerry Brito,
Martín Cave,
Robert W. Crandall,
Larry F. Darby,
Everett M. Ehrlich,
Jeffrey A. Eisenach,
Jerry Ellig,
Henry Ergas,
David J. Farber,
Gerald R. Faulhaber,
Robert W. Hahn,
Alfred E. Kahn,
Wayne A. Leighton,
Robert E. Litan,
Glen O. Robinson,
Hal J. Singer,
Ver L. Smith,
William E. Taylor,
Timothy J. Tardiff,
Leonard Waverman,
Dennis L. Weisman
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.1587058
Subject(s) - economics , neutrality , net neutrality , macroeconomics , public economics , natural resource economics , political science , law , the internet , computer science , world wide web
In the authors' shared opinion, the economic evidence does not support the regulations proposed in the Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices (the “NPRM”). To the contrary, the economic evidence provides no support for the existence of market failure sufficient to warrant ex ante regulation of the type proposed by the Commission, and strongly suggests that the regulations, if adopted, would reduce consumer welfare in both the short and long run. To the extent the types of conduct addressed in the NPRM may, in isolated circumstances, have the potential to harm competition or consumers, the Commission and other regulatory bodies have the ability to deter or prohibit such conduct on a case-by-case basis, through the application of existing doctrines and procedures. Hence, the approach advocated in the NPRM is not necessary to achieve whatever economic benefits may be associated with prohibiting harmful discrimination on the Internet.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom