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Strategic Interactions Between An Independent Central Bank And A Myopic Government With Government Debt
Author(s) -
Sven Jari Stehn,
David Vines
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.1475509
Subject(s) - government debt , government (linguistics) , central bank , debt , financial system , business , economics , monetary economics , finance , monetary policy , linguistics , philosophy

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