Rule and Revenue in Egypt and Rome: Political Stability and Fiscal Institutions

Herrschaft und Staatseinkommen in Ägypten und Rom: Zur Wechselwirkung von Politischer Stabilität und Besteuerung«. This paper investigates what determines fiscal institutions and the burden of taxation using a case study from ancient history. It evaluates Levi's model of taxation in the Roman Republic, according to which rulers' high discount rates in periods of political instability encour- age them to adopt a more predatory fiscal regime. The evi- dence for fiscal reform in the transition from the Republic to the Principate seems to support her hypothesis but re- mains a matter of debate among historians. Egypt's transi- tion from a Hellenistic kingdom to a Roman province under the Principate provides an analogous case for which there are better data. The Egyptian evidence shows a correlation between rulers' discount rates and fiscal regimes that is consistent with Levi's hypothesis.