The Effect of Status on Voluntary Contribution

Fundraisers often start their campaigns by soliciting the wealthier, more recognized, and respected individuals in a community. We examine whether an explanation for such a contribution ordering may be that people prefer to associate with those of higher rather than lower social ranking than themselves. In a simple model of charitable giving we investigate whether concerns for status may give rise to an optimal solicitation ordering similar to that used by many fundraisers. We find that indeed contributions and aggregate earnings are larger if high-status donors are solicited before rather than after those of low status. We test this prediction experimentally by inducing a status differential in the laboratory and reversing the contribution order between high- and low-status participants. Consistent with the economic prediction we find that low-status followers are likely to mimic contributions by high-status leaders, and that this encourages high-status leaders to contribute. Contributions are therefore larger when individuals of high status contribute before rather than after those of low status.