A Study of Covert Communications in Space Platforms Hosting Government Payloads
Author(s) -
Thuy Nguyen
Publication year - 2015
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.21236/ada613902
Subject(s) - covert , government (linguistics) , space (punctuation) , telecommunications , computer science , computer security , operating system , philosophy , linguistics
: In recent years, unmanned space vehicles have increasingly become targets of cyber-attacks. Exacerbating the problem is the desire to reduce cost and accelerate access to space by hosting government-supplied payloads on commercial space platforms. These commercially hosted payloads require stringent confidentiality protection and encryption alone is not sufficient to protect against illegal information leakage on a spacecraft with multilevel security (cross-domain) capabilities. Covert channels may still exist and be exploited by colluding entities to communicate secretly via shared resources. This report describes a preliminary study of potential covert channels in communications protocols used in satellites--specifically MIL-STD-1553B and SpaceWire.
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