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: Stability operations have been a mainstay of U.S. Army operations since the Revolutionary War. However, despite the propensity for the military to conduct this type of operation the U.S. Army has a mixed record of executing stability tasks. This monograph identifies five factors that contribute to the effectiveness of stability operations: institutional thinking, development of a comprehensive plan, strategic and military objectives that include elements of stability, simultaneous execution of stability tasks with offensive and defensive tasks, and civil-military cooperation. Two case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the five contributing factors in achieving strategic objectives. The Philippine War of 1898 demonstrates that unbiased institutional thinking, a single, holistic plan, stability-related objectives, and simultaneous execution of stability, offense, and defense tasks all provide effective means to accomplish strategic objectives. The invasion of Panama in 1989, however, illustrates that constrained institutional thought, separate combat and post-combat plans, objectives limited to security concerns, and a lack of integrated stability and offensive tasks make victory much more difficult. Achieving strategic objectives is not impossible given those conditions, but commanders must rely on a greater degree of adaptation and flexibility to achieve strategic objectives. Both case studies also demonstrate the significance of civil-military cooperation in limiting unnecessary tension in conflict resolution. Current Unified Land Operations doctrine accounts for these factors fairly well, but challenges arise in their application. These include a lack of training or poor training effectiveness, categorizing stability tasks as less important than offensive and defensive tasks, and limiting the scope of objectives by overlooking stability goals. If the U.S. Army can overcome these challenges, it will develop and enhanced capability to execute stability tasks

The Fatal Five? Five Factors That Enhance Effectiveness of Stability Operations