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: On December 12, 1979, NATO formally decided on the modernization and deployment of intermediate-range theater nuclear weapons. These were to be stationed in Europe starting in 1983. At the same time, NATO offered to negotiate with the Soviet Union regarding arms control for intermediate-range nuclear weapons. This decision is commonly known as NATO s dual-track decision. The United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany contributed fundamentally to the agreement. This monograph examines how the respective U.S. and German history, national security interests and strategies shaped NATO s 1979 dual-track decision. Particular emphasis is given to how the principal political leaders of both countries in retrospect described and assessed the origins of the dual-track decision. This includes their personal roles, personal interpretations and the influence of their personal relationships to each other on the decision making.

NATO's 1979 Dual-Track Decision: National Interests and the Influence of Former Political Leaders of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany