Probabilistic Quantitative Precipitation Forecasting using a Two-Stage Spatial Model

AUTHOR: Ms. Carol A. Wortman TITLE: Inefficient Battle Command Results From Unique Commanders Solutions FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 03 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 5,659 PAGES: 29 KEY TERMS: Net-Centric, Army Battle Command System, ABCS, Information Technology CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified The purpose of this paper is to assess the strategic impacts of unit procured Information Technology (IT) in support of Battle Command (BC) and assess the Army major acquisition programs ability to support urgent warfighter needs. Today's selection and use of BC systems is a highly competitive process and extremely leader centric. Unit commanders and their staff, outside of the Army's acquisition process, expend unit funds to purchase or create BC systems that meet their specialize approach to BC. Training and information is not available to commanders that describe the impacts of pursuing their own BC solutions to meet individual preferences. Army acquisition programs are at a competitive disadvantage in meeting urgent warfighter needs and therefore users circumvent the system rather than use it. The result is duplicative and inconsistent unit solutions that reduce the effectiveness of BC and the efficiency of resources. Unity of effort is needed to balance warfighter innovation, manage the impact of these innovations, and the ability to incorporate successful innovations into army acquisition programs for long term sustainment. INEFFICIENT BATTLE COMMAND RESULTS FROM UNIQUE COMMANDERS SOLUTIONS Our ability to leverage the power of information will be key to our success in the 21st Century. — Honorable John G. Grimes ASD(NII)/DoD CIO Introduction The DoD Net-Centricity initiatives and Army 2007 Posture Statement are based on the premise that effective use of information technology will lead to a military dominant force. The DoD Net-Centricity objective is to provide Joint commanders with a globally networked environment (interconnecting infrastructure, systems, processes, and people) within which data is shared seamlessly and in a timely manner among users, applications, and platforms enabling rapid decision superiority, resulting in full spectrum dominance. The 2007 Army Posture Statement specifies that by leveraging technologies, and the power of the Network, “soldiers and commanders will enjoy far greater ability to see and to act first – ahead of their adversaries – while dealing with the full spectrum of challenges they will face.” The change in the strategic environment resulting from the terrorist attacks in 2001 has significantly re-scoped Army modernization efforts. By 2003, with our Nation conducting operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq there was a need to provide a consistent set of BC solutions across the force to enable timely sharing of BC information. As such, the Chief of Staff of the Army provided guidance in August 2003 to build the 'Good Enough' Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) and field it to the active force. This version was designated as ABCS 6.4. Today, ABCS is trained and fielded to units deploying to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regardless of theater its use is limited. The bulk of BC is being conducted using a variety of unit procured non standard emerging systems. Often these systems are sought after and purchased to meet a commander’s perceived need that is either 1) not offered by the ABCS systems, 2) the warfighter is unaware of the capability in ABCS, or 3) he wants a specific visualization that is not offered by ABCS. The impact of this non standardization is an inability of units to synchronize an approach to Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) across the area of operations. The intent of this SRP to provide a background on ABCS and the effects of unit employment of non standard solutions in use in Iraq from 2005 to the present day; to provide an analysis of what drives units to procure their own systems; and the resulting strategic impacts of the unique solutions across DOTMLPF. It will also take a critical look at the Army acquisition process and its constraints on programs of record resulting in the systems inability to be competitive in the development of BC. It will then describe several initiatives that have focused on resolving issues associated with the proliferation of software in the CENTCOM AOR. Finally it will offer specific recommendations that would balance BC standardization with commander’s specific preferences with the goal of achieving the Net-Centric and Army Posture Statement premise of military dominance. Background FM 3.0 defines BC as "the exercise of command in operations against a hostile, thinking enemy." Leadership and decision making are central to the Battle Command