Proximal, Distal, and the Politics of Causation: What’s Level Got to Do With It?
Author(s) -
Nancy Krieger
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
american journal of public health
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.284
H-Index - 264
eISSN - 1541-0048
pISSN - 0090-0036
DOI - 10.2105/ajph.2007.111278
Subject(s) - causation , terminology , accountability , public health , politics , causality (physics) , perspective (graphical) , power (physics) , determinism , sociology , social psychology , epistemology , psychology , medicine , political science , law , pathology , computer science , philosophy , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence
Causal thinking in public health, and especially in the growing literature on social determinants of health, routinely employs the terminology of proximal (or downstream) and distal (or upstream). I argue that the use of these terms is problematic and adversely affects public health research, practice, and causal accountability. At issue are distortions created by conflating measures of space, time, level, and causal strength. To make this case, I draw on an ecosocial perspective to show how public health got caught in the middle of the problematic proximal-distal divide--surprisingly embraced by both biomedical and social determinist frameworks--and propose replacing the terms proximal and distal with explicit language about levels, pathways, and power.
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