FORGETTING: DECONSTRUCTIVE STRATEGIES IN LIGHT OF PHENOMENOLOGY

In this paper, I propose a Derridean deconstructive account of forgetting as an aporetic structure, and compare this with Husserl’s phenomenological description of memory. The Derridean interpretation is based off of Derrida’s analyses of the gift and of forgiveness. For the Derridean, forgetting is an ethical impossibility, whereas for Husserl, it is an epistemological impossibility. Husserlian phenomenology maintains that memory is a re-activation of specific acts of intentionality. The Husserlian and Derridean accounts of forgetting join to directly challenge the Nietzschean and Jamesian contentions that forgetting is necessary to human survival. Instead of claiming that forgetting is necessary, Derrida and Husserl support the claim that it is impossible to fully forget.