T. Staehler, Hegel, Husserl and the Phenomenology of Historical Worlds

universality (PhR, § 357) which has to be sublated in the German state. Concerning the problems with this position which leaves out those states in which no rational concept of freedom has been realized yet, see Ludwig Siep, ‘Was heißt “Aufhebung der Moralität in Sittlichkeit”, in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie?’ (‘What does “Sublation of Morality into Sittlichkeit” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right Mean?’) Hegel-Studien (Hegel Studies) 17 [1982]: 92). It should also be noted that the state of freedom in the German state had not as such amounted to a freedom of expression on spiritual matters, and while Hegel now and then hints at some criticism, there could be reasons linked to Hegel’s historical world as to why he was not more of a revolutionary and left this to the Marxists. 3. A different topic which cannot be treated here concerns the question as to whether religion exhibits some structural similarity with the more developed shape of Sittlichkeit and whether the religious community is similar to the sittliche community. 4. Within the part on Sittlichkeit, there is a further distinction between the family which represents the immediate shape of Sittlichkeit, civil society as a shape of diremption which contains elements of morality and the state as fully developed Sittlichkeit. 5. Hegel, Enc. III, § 513. 6. Ludwig Siep shows how the sublation of morality into Sittlichkeit means still giving a certain right to morality on the level of Sittlichkeit: Siep, ‘Aufhebung’. Siep describes the position of Sittlichkeit in Hegel well: ‘The confidence that the private and public realization of myself is overall secured in an autonomous legal, social, and cultural state must not be confused with a blind trust in any kind of state authority, law or even order.’ (Siep, ‘Aufhebung’, 92). 7. Hegel, PhR, § 147. 8. We cannot examine here to what extent this criticism does justice to Kant’s philosophy. However, Hegel’s objections are rather extrinsic, so one might suspect that a response from a Kantian perspective could be formulated. The basic objection concerning an emptiness of content and the subjectivity of morality comes closer to the core of Kant’s theory. 9. Hegel, PhS, 313/254. 10. Hegel, PhS, 325/262. 11. Hegel, PhS, 326f./265. 12. Hegel, PhS, 445/366. 13. Hegel, PhS, 464/383. 14. Conscience bears certain similarities with sense-certainty. Certainly, we are now concerned with an entirely different, more advanced level; we are concerned with Spirit, whereas sense-certainty relates to the individual. Yet the failure of sensecertainty to preserve its standpoint has essentially been connected to the fact that we are always in a community and conversation with others. Another connection between sense-certainty and conscience lies in the character of beginning which both of them exhibit. Sense-certainty forms the beginning of the journey of