Teaching The Art Of Act Utilitarianism: Ethical Decision Making In The Design Stage
Author(s) -
Hamid Khan
Publication year - 2020
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
DOI - 10.18260/1-2--13765
Subject(s) - business ethics , utilitarianism , ethical dilemma , normative ethics , meta ethics , virtue ethics , deontological ethics , computer ethics , dilemma , information ethics , competence (human resources) , engineering ethics , nursing ethics , psychology , sociology , virtue , political science , social psychology , public relations , epistemology , engineering , law , philosophy
Students in an engineering design and ethics class started with the testing of a student’s “cynicism quotient” of engineering business practice. Then they were tested with an Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) instrument for their perceptual validation. After examining some design failures and ethical dilemma cases in the semester, the students felt that they have learned something of importance— economics, morality, virtue ethics, Kantian theory, Deontological theory and Teleological theory. They, then, evaluated their own professional competence using theories of “ethics and the individual,” “ethics and the technical manager,” “ethics and the organization,” and ethics of the global business. Then they tested different theories of “ethical displacements” as it worked in different levels: individual, department, organization, and industry levels. In this paper we are going to show significant improvement in student attitudes and ethical understanding through philosophical examination of a business case study. We will take formal measures of student attitudes before and after modular interventions. Assessing Student Attitudes toward Business An integrated concept in ethics was discussed for student’s individual and professional development of business ethics. Students exposed to such ethics courses with stimulating ethics cases faced hard questions to answer, when placed in an ethical dilemma. They learned one thing important: “Deciding what’s right: a prescriptive approach.” The outline of the class discussion will be presented in thirteen ethics development modules and they will be integrated by a comprehensive case study to address the ethical dilemma of engineers and managers faced at the very design implementation stage. Under condition of simulated input via a case study, their behavioral reactions will be monitored. With the introduction of a Business Cynicism questionnaire at the outset it was expected that students would be ready to experience business ethics and practices and they would learn ethical constructs in the following domains: financial gain and profit motive, ethical standards in business, financially successful business, relevance of moral values, rules of business, and the P ge 9.199.1 Proceedings of the 2004 American Society for Engineering Education Annual Conference & Exposition Copyright © 2004, American Society for Engineering Education. game of business, the act-utilitarianism, and the rule-utilitarianism. The students were given the following business cynicism pretest and posttest in the duration of the semester. Business Cynicism Quotient Questionnaire-Pretest Answer the following questions as honestly as you can. Circle the number between 1 and 5 that best represents your own beliefs about business. The class averages are in red. Strongly disagree Strongly agree 1. Financial gain is all that counts in business. 1 2 3 4 5 2. Ethical standards must be compromised 1 2 3 4 5 in business practices. 3. The more financially successful the business 1 2 3 4 5 person, the more unethical the behavior. 4. Moral values are irrelevant in business. 1 2 3 4 5 5. The business world has its own rules. 1 2 3 4 5 6. Business persons care only about making profit. 1 2 3 4 5 7. Business is like a game one plays is to win. 1 2 3 4 5 8. In business, people will do anything to 1 2 3 4 5 further their own interest. 9. Competition forces business managers 1 2 3 4 5 to resort to shady practices. 10. The profit motive pressures managers 1 2 3 4 5 to compromise their ethical concerns. Table 1 Student pretest responses of ethical cynicism quotient Then the students were given the Ford Pinto Case before any theories of ethics were discussed. P ge 9.199.2 Proceedings of the 2004 American Society for Engineering Education Annual Conference & Exposition Copyright © 2004, American Society for Engineering Education. In the beginning of a senior business ethics class, students were given an ethical cynicism test. The class was pretty cynical, to say the least. The average cynical measure was 37 out of a maximum of 50. Six out of ten elements of ethics were on the most cynical side. Students at this stage did not know how business ethics works. At least majority of them had a very strong sense of personal moral ethicsthe unspoiled ethics. The students were advised that learning to make ethical decision making in the business setting will require them to learn many dimensions of ethics from a theoretical standpoint and then apply them selectively in the world of business using design and product safety, marketing advertising, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, rights and value, justice and the market system, concept of whistle blowing, trade secrets and the conflict of interest, construct of privacy, health and safety, and ethics in finance. Before the case was discussed, the class took an MBTI typology test to determine their approximate orientation toward judging category. 22% were judging type. HUMANMETRICS OF THE ETHICS CLASS Jung-Typology Pre-Test Averages of the class INTJ Introverted Intuitive Thinking Judging Strength of the preferences % 56 11 11 22 Table 2 Student pretest responses of MBTI personalities aggregate Qualitative analysis of class type formula: • Moderately expressed introvert personalities • Slightly expressed intuitive personalities • Slightly expressed thinking personalities • Slightly expressed judging personalities Cost benefit analyses: Ford Pinto Design Adapted from Boatright [1] “In the late 1960s, American automakers were faced with serious competition from German and Japanese firms in the subcompact market. Some Detroit executives felt that they should concentrate on medium-size and larger models and let foreign competitors with their lower costs have the small car market. Others argued that the sub compact market was potentially lucrative and should be pursued. Ford, whose market position had eroded, opted for the later strategy, and in 1968 it decided to produce the Pinto. P ge 9.199.3 Proceedings of the 2004 American Society for Engineering Education Annual Conference & Exposition Copyright © 2004, American Society for Engineering Education. Although production planning for the new model normally takes about 3 1/2 years, Ford decided to try to move from conception to production in two years; it wanted the Pinto ready for 1971 model year. In normal time frame, design changes and quality assurance standards are in place largely before production line tooling. But tooling requires about a year and a half, and hence, in the case of Pinto, tooling and product development overlapped considerably. Prior to production of the Pinto, Ford crash-tested 11 Pintos as part of its quality assurance program. The tests were conducted in part with an eye to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 301, which was proposed for adoption by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1968. Standard 301 proposed that all autos be required to withstand a fixed-barrier impact of 20 mph without loss of fuel. Of Ford’s 11 tests, conducted at an average impact speed of 31 mph, only three autos passed with unbroken fuel tanks. None of eight standard-designed Pintos passed. In one successful test a plastic baffle was placed between the front of the gas tank and the differential housing. In a second successful test, a piece of steel was placed between the tank and rear bumper. The third successful test was of a Pinto with a rubberlined gas tank. Ford decided to go ahead with this gas tank design, and not alter the tank in light of its crash tests. It did so for several reasons. First, cost-benefit analysis, as detailed in a Ford memorandum titled “fatalities associated with crash induced fuel leakage and fires,” suggested that there was no advantages in upgrading the Pinto’s fuel tank. In the early 1970s, NHTSA decided that cost-benefit analysis was an appropriate basis for safety design standards. To make such an analysis some specific value had to me placed on human life, and NHTSA decided on a figure of $200,725 as the estimated cost to society every time a person is killed in an auto accident: Future productivity losses Direct $132,000 Indirect 41,300 Medical costs hospital 700 other 425 property damage 1,500 Insurance Administration 4,700 Legal and Court 3,000 Employ losses 1000 Victims pain and suffering 10,000 funeral 900 assets (lost consumption) 5,000 miscellaneous accident costs 200 total per fatality 200,725 Using NHTSA's data, Ford calculated costs and benefits by considering the variables of lives saved by product redesign and the cost of the product. For example a Ford internal Page 9.199.4 Proceedings of the 2004 American Society for Engineering Education Annual Conference & Exposition Copyright © 2004, American Society for Engineering Education. memorandum gives the following calculation of an $11 gas tank improvement, which was estimated to save 180 lives. Benefits Savings: 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2100 burn vehicles Unit cost: $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle Total Benefit: 180 * 200,000 + 180 * 67,000 + 2100 * 700 = 49.5 million. Costs Sales: 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks Unit cost: $11 per car, $11 per track Total cost: 12,500,000 * 11 =137 million. Since the costs of the $11 safety improvement outweighed its benefits, Ford maintained they were not justified in making the improvement. A second factor in Ford’s decision was that the Pinto did meet all Federal Auto Safety Standards set at the time. NH.TSA standard 301 was only a proposed rule. It was strenuously opposed by the auto industry, and was only adopted in 1977. Furthermore Ford’s Pinto tests were at an average speed of 31 mph-considerably over the 20 mph speed proposed in Standard 301. A third factor was that Ford had to cut costs to be competitive. Ford wanted the Pinto to weigh less than 2000 pounds and cost less than $2000. (“The limits of 2000.”) It felt that control of
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