Exposing The Values Of Technology Through The Liberal Arts

1 The concept of non-neutrality of technology is well established in the philosophy of technology literature. Despite this long history of defending the idea that technology, far from being neutral, actually embodies certain values and biases, engineering students do not readily agree with the concept at face value. They are much more apt to accept the simple cliché that “guns don’t kill people; people do.” They fall quickly into the misconception that since the tool has no volition nor agency it must be neutral. Why is it important to establish non-neutrality? Failure to recognize non-neutrality leads to tunnel vision and an inability to foresee the broad consequences of a particular technology. If technology is neutral, then the designers, manufacturers, and distributors of technology have little or no responsibility with regard to that technology. There are a number of methods that can be used to persuade students that the technology they design is not neutral, some as simple as using better terminology that more clearly communicates with students. However, one of the most important aspects of convincing students of this concept and more importantly, helping them to see the broad implications, is a strong liberal arts curriculum. An effective liberal arts education helps engineering students to uncover and expose the inherent values that are built into technology as it is developed and deployed. It also helps students identify the multitude of ways those values built into a technology affect our society. Recognizing the feedback between technology and society is essential in evaluating technology effectively from an ethical and moral standpoint. Non-neutrality in the literature 2 The non-neutrality of technology is well established in the philosophy of technology literature, but this is not so in our society at large. More importantly, it is not well established within the typical engineering student population, perhaps because most students are not familiar with the literature on the subject. Carl Mitcham notes that for many, the question of neutrality turns on the specific meaning of “use”. He differentiates between those that stress “use” as the technical function of a technology (which argues for the non-neutrality of technology) and those that stress “use” as the act of using the technology to perform its technical function (which argues for the neutrality of technology).1 That is, if one looks at the purpose and function of a technology, one sees that it is biased towards certain uses and thus non-neutral; if one considers the purpose only fulfilled in the actual act of use (instrumentalism), then the technology itself seems neutral. In the remainder of this section we will first briefly consider authors that have used instrumentalism to support the notion of neutrality. Second, we will look at authors that directly refute instrumentalism. Third, we will examine two warnings about the dangers of treating technology as mere ends. Fourth, we will turn to authors that consider technology essential to our humanity. Fifth, we will list some P ge 866.1 Proceedings of the 2003 American Society for Engineering Education Annual Conference & Exposition Copyright © 2003, American Society for Engineering Education darker philosophical approaches to technology. Finally we will survey ASEE papers that address the neutrality of technology. Philosophers that stress the instrumental nature of technology typically argue that technology itself is neutral – it is the act of using the technology that is value-laden. Joseph Pitt is representative of this viewpoint: “...tools and technical systems are inherently ideologically neutral”2 and later, “...there is ring of truth to: ’Guns don’t kill people, people do’... The tools by themselves do nothing.”3 Similarly, Rammert, building on the work of John Dewey, binds function to use, “Technology has no existence and function outside of its use. It is what I would like to call the use-relations that create both the handled object as a tool and the manipulating gesture as technical practice.”4 Some of the earliest philosophers might be considered closet instrumentalists, as they saw technology as merely the fabric on which human actions were interweaved: “The traditional view has been that social institutions (family, religion, economy, state) tend toward a certain independence in ways that call for an attentive effort to incorporate and subordinate them to any particular vision of justice or the good.... In such works [Plato, Aristotle], however, techne remains in the background; it seems to be accepted as relatively pliable, readily following the goals embodied in other social institutions.”5 Many scholars have argued effectively against the neutrality of technology – we will consider here four that directly address the instrumental view. Allchin, in answer to Pitt, claims “it is disingenuous nowadays to claim [that technology is neutral]...the very artifacts bias who can and cannot use them.”6 William F. Ogburn, moves us from instrumentalism towards non-neutrality by relating function and the act of using. “The significance of technology lies in what it does...It is the function of the structure that gives it importance, and the function of the products of technology is use by human beings. Technology is therefore essentially social.”7 Ibo van de Poel notes the prevalence of the “means” viewpoint, “the idea that technology is a means to an end is still a popular vision, both among engineers and non-engineers. This so-called instrumental vision of technology implies that the choice of technological means is a neutral affair, because it is determined by the goals that have been formulated for a technology.”8 The paper goes on to enumerate three reasons the instrumental view is unsatisfactory: 1) formulation of goals and choice of technological means are not independent, 2) choice of means for a given end is not neutral, 3) technologies realize more than their intended goal. Borgmann also considers the “means” viewpoint and claims "...it is an equivocation to speak indifferently of tools in a modern and in a pretechnological setting. A means in a traditional culture is never mere but always and inextricably woven into a context of ends." 9 Many authors warn of the dangers of treating technology as mere means. Schuurman notes the consequences of ignoring the values intrinsic to technology: “the view that technology is neutral precludes acknowledgement of human responsibility within technology itself.”10 In Monsma we find an argument that even if one grants that technology is mere means towards some end, that by itself does not justify the claim of neutrality: “...technology is value-laden, the product of the inevitable valuing activities of human beings. Clearly, the non-neutrality and the value-ladenness of technology are two sides of the same coin.”11 Assuming that means are neutral (an instrumentalist view) could thus be viewed as a twist on the old error of letting the end justify the means. Page 866.2 Proceedings of the 2003 American Society for Engineering Education Annual Conference & Exposition Copyright © 2003, American Society for Engineering Education Mitcham ties non-neutrality to a view of technology as the implementation of human will: “Human action is ultimately not determined by reason. There is something more fundamental, more basic, more real – namely the will. This is witnessed by the fact of incontinence; knowing what is good on a rational level, human beings nevertheless often do something else. The challenge of such a phenomenon is heightened by the manifestation of technology as volition.”12 Don Ihde makes the case that technology has both an amplifying and corresponding reducing effect: “This non-neutral, transformative power of humans enhanced by technologies is an essential feature of the human-technology relations we shall examine.”13 Two philosophers that see technology as non-neutral, but in a darker manner, are Ellul and Heidegger. The French philosopher Jacques Ellul argues that technology is not neutral, but more importantly, that we are not in a position to judge technology. Ellul grants technology autonomy – it will do what it will do regardless of what we think.14 The German philosopher Martin Heidegger points out an ominous danger of believing in the myth of neutrality: “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.”15 Finally, it is worth noting that while a host of papers have appeared in ASEE publications on the topic of professional ethics, only a small number have focused on the non-neutrality of technology. One of the rare examples is Vanderburg16, which addresses the problem of a twostage approach in preventative engineering, where the technological solution of the first stage is considered value-neutral. A few more papers indirectly address neutrality in lamenting the problem of students who view the entire profession of engineering as value-neutral, such as Catalano17 and Nair18. Student resistance to non-neutrality 3 Given that some philosophers (the instrumentalists) argue for the neutrality of technology, it is not surprising that many students do not accept the non-neutrality of technology at face value. However, most students do not come to their position through deep conversance with the philosophical literature. The lack of material in ASEE publications is revealing – if educators are not writing about it, perhaps neither are they teaching about it. The dangers of this omission will be discussed in the next section, but let us first consider why students hold to non-neutrality if it is not on the basis of literature or formal education. Students’ rationa