The reductionism of Weber's social science methodology and theory of action

Max Weber is a sociology classic who left behind the most detailed historical explanations, but only at the expense of theoretical coherence. At least this is how Weber was characterized by Richard Münch (1981, 18) when compared to Marx and Durkheim. Weber’s methodology is usually considered unconstrained, not burdened by great ideals of the scientific method. When criticized then it is so for its incoherence and ambiguity. This text takes a different perspective on Weber, joining a minority stream in Weberian literature represented by gregor Schöllgen (1982, 1984, 1998). This stream corrects the assumption of “liberal” methodology and reveals reductionist tendencies in Weber’s approach, showing that he did not only study action neutrally but also prescribed it. In contrast to Schöllgen who presumes that Weber was limited to the purposive-rational type of action (1998, 73), we will be more sympathetic of the core of Weber’s method and, following Talcott Parson’s example, pay attention to signs of a general concept of action.