Structuring IS Outsourcing Contracts for Mutual Gain: An Approach to Analyzing Performance Incentive Schemes
Author(s) -
Noel Bryson
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
journal of the association for information systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.877
H-Index - 78
ISSN - 1536-9323
DOI - 10.17705/1jais.00009
Subject(s) - outsourcing , structuring , vendor , incentive , business , knowledge process outsourcing , industrial organization , set (abstract data type) , risk analysis (engineering) , process management , marketing , computer science , economics , finance , microeconomics , programming language
As information systems managers come under increasing pressure to improve the cost performance of information processing, outsourcing has become an important management strategy. Although information systems outsourcing is now a major industry, it is still a new decision problem for many managers. As managers gain more and more experience with IS outsourcing, satisfaction with vendor performance is becoming a major issue. Key to managing outsourcing relationships is the outsourcing contract. These contracts assign responsibilities and rewards for the parties. However, improperly or incompletely written contracts have lead to adverse problems. How then are managers to choose from a set of options that which is most appropriate for their firm? Outsourcing problems are complex and
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