Cognitive Disabilities and the Scope of Contractualist Justice

Throughout his theory of justice, Rawls assumes "persons are normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life, and so have the requisite capacities for assuming that role" (Political 21). He acknowledges "there is the question of what is owed to those who fail to meet this condition, either temporarily (from illness and accident) or permanently" (Political 21). His answer is that he "very much doubts" whether it is possible to answer this question within the scope of justice as fairness. Rawls suggests three alternative responses to the problems on which justice as fairness may fail. One possible response is this: "perhaps we simply lack the ingenuity to see how the extension may proceed" (Political 21). Second, it's possible that "the idea of political justice does not cover everything, nor should we expect it to". Giving this response would imply that the treatment of people with cognitive disabilities is not a matter of justice, but rather a matter of charity or compassion. Third, "the problem may indeed be one of political justice but justice as fairness is not correct in this case, however well it may do for other cases. How deep a fault this is must wait until the case itself can be examined". This last response implies that Rawls's conception of justice as fairness is indeed intended to cover all cases, but turns out to need amendment as it pertains to certain cases.