Theoretical Virtues and Theory Adjudication in the Origin of Life Debate

When comparing and evaluating rival scientific theories, decisions as to which theory best explains the available data are often made in light of features exemplified by (or at least believed to be exemplified by) one or more of the theories in question. Among these "theoretical virtues" are simplicity, predictive accuracy, internal consistency, fecundity, and the ability to solve external, conceptual problems. Currently, in the debate over life's origin, it appears that the precise role and relative importance of certain theoretical virtues has not yet been established. For example, if the editors of Paleobiology or The Skeptical Inquirer were to receive a manuscript arguing for a special creationist or Lamarckian view of the origin and purpose of the platypus' oddlyshaped bill, it is not likely that they would, at least prima facie, give it much consideration for publication. Similarly, it is unlikely that those at the San Diego based Institute for Creation Research would be convinced by, e.g., Douglas Futuyma's case for human evolution. Presumably, the representatives of these and other groups come to their respective conclusions not because they are largely ignorant of the available empirical data, but rather because they disagree about what counts as a theoretical virtue in the first place, and because they are at odds regarding how a given virtue ought to factor into one's evaluation of the available data. Lamentably, despite 150 years of conflict over when and how life began, in-depth treatments of theoretical virtues and their role in the debate over l ife 's origin are vir tually non-ex is ten t . 2 Nonetheless, when such discussions do appear in print, the virtues most commonly treated are testability, simplicity, and fecundityi.e., fruitfulness for further research.