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Is The Skeptical Attitude the Attitude of the Skeptic?
Author(s) -
Katarzyna Paprzycka
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
auslegung a journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2376-6727
pISSN - 0733-4311
DOI - 10.17161/ajp.1808.9341
Subject(s) - skepticism , certainty , contradiction , epistemology , philosophy , consciousness , psychology
There is something disturbing in the skeptic's claim that we do not know anything. It appears inconsistent because his claim about our not knowing anything seems to contradict his knowing this very fact. It is noteworthy that it is this point that has been very prominent in various criticisms launched on skepticism. Hegel argues, for example, that the skeptic contradicts himself for there is a deep disparity between his way of life and his self-conception. "[The skeptical consciousness) affirms the nullity of seeing, hearing, etc., yet it is itself seeing, hearing, etc."1 Wittgenstein gives a similar response. He argues that there is a contradiction between the certainty which underlies language-games we engage in (and that we do engage in them is necessary for us to think at all) and the only subsequently expressed doubt. We can doubt something only if we are certain of something else. We cannot doubt everything. "The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty."2

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