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Hard Determinism and the Moral "Ought"
Author(s) -
Lenore Kuo
Publication year - 1987
Publication title -
auslegung a journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2376-6727
pISSN - 0733-4311
DOI - 10.17161/ajp.1808.9155
Subject(s) - determinism , free will , epistemology , compatibilism , philosophy
In this brief paper, I shall be concerned with offering a partial answer to this charge by considering the effects of hard determinism on one of the more significant and fundamental concepts of traditional ethics, that of the moral 'ought.' By 'hard determinism' I refer to the thesis which maintains that all actions are caused and therefore no one is free with regard to his/her actions. By implication it follows that no one is morally responsible for his/her actions. In what follows, I shall demonstrate that (1) traditional assumptions regarding the moral 'ought' are, indeed, in conflict with hard

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