Charles Peirce's Alternative to the Skeptcial Dilemma

The problem of skepticism is the paradigmatic philosophical problem, because it is the kind of problem that appears to be elusive of decisive resolution and,thus it is the kind of problem that keeps philosophy in business. Of course, every theory of knowledge attempts to either refute skepticism, explain why we cannot psychologically accept it, or dismiss it as a pseudo problem. But after over 2000 years the problem is still being discussed, with fresh approaches being advanced every other month, from which I conclude that no absolutely decisive and compelling solution to the problem has been as yet formulated. There are, moreover, no clear proponents of skepticism. Even Barry Stroud, the latest champion of taking skepticism seriously, says that skepticism . . . i s not something we should seriously consider adopting . . . n i So we have a situation in which a particular claim—the claim that we should maintain skeptical doubts concerning the ontological status of the objects of perception--!s neither openly defended nor yet decisively refuted.