Moral Objectivism

The possibility, let alone the actuality, of an objective morality has intrigued philosophers for well over two millennia. Though much discussed, the problem of the nature of morality is difficult to clearly conceptualize. To conclude that "moral objectivity" is a contested concept is, to my mind, simply to give up the philosophical challenge of assessing the soundness of the concept. Moral objectivists face major difficulties. In this paper I examine these difficulties, and I suggest that there are strong competitive subjectivist options and reservations. Objectivism and subjectivism come in various forms. R. Franklin writes that an objectivist "asserts, and a subjectivist denies, that there are at least sometimes ultimately better reasons for one moral view than for alternatives. Early emotive and prescriptive views were subjectivist [in this sense]. 1 , 1 As a thumbnail sketch of a form of subjectivism, this acceptably describes one of the central tenets of subjective ethical naturalism. R. M. Hare argues that there are ambiguities in the distinction between subjective and objective statements. 2 Consider the following three sentences: (a) The cat is on the mat; (b) I like cats; and (c) Call the cat. The subjective-objective distinction, argues Hare, is ambiguous between (1) the distinction between (a), on the one hand, and (b) and (c), on the other hand, and (2) the distinction between (a) and (b), on the one hand, and (c) on the other hand. Hare prefers to call (a) and (b) 'descriptive' utterances and (c) a 'non-descriptive' utterance. The sense in which (b) is subjective as opposed to the sense in which (a) is objective, is the sense in which I claim morality is subjective. Both (a) and (b) are naturalistic claims--stating facts about the world disclosed by science. Those who take moral claims to be like (a) can be called objective naturalists. Objectivism can also be supported by non-naturalistic arguments; moral truths are not discoverable by scientific methods. Unlike non-descriptivists and objectivists, subjectivists claim that moral rightness and wrongness is dependent on the attitudes or inclinations of some set of speakers.