The Question of Conation in Action Theory

In some recent and most interesting articles, Myles Brand argues that intending has an exclusively conative feature. 1 This conative feature is said by Brand to be non-cognitive and to be that aspect of an episode of intending which moves an agent to act. Brand alleges that the conative feature of intending must be included in any satisfactory answer to what he calls the fundamental question in action theory: what characteristics must a mental event possess in order to be the proximate cause of action? Brand contends that no philosophical theory of the relation between intending and acting has been offered which includes the conative feature of intending as an element. Therefore, he thinks that no philosophical theory of the relation between intending and acting has answered the fundamental question in action theory. I shall argue, however, that one contemporary theory of the relation between intending and acting does contain an account of the conative feature of which Brand speaks. I shall submit that Hector-Neri Castaneda's theory of the relation between intending and acting provides an answer to the fundamental question in action theory. 1 Brand's identification of a conative component of intending is best understood in light of the recent history of Causal theories of action. Basciaily, a Causal theory is one which holds that intentional action is caused by a preceding mental event of a particular kind. Recent interest and developments in such theories owe much in impetus to the work of Donald Davidson whose version of the Causal theory holds that the mental event causing action is the combination of a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind and the belief that such actions can be performed. 1 A proattitude, according to Davidson, can be a desire, a wanting, an urging, a prompting, and numerous other things, such as a moral view, an aesthetic principle, a private goal, etc. Davidson's account, however, has been severely criticized. Wilfrid Sellars, for example, finds Davidson's theory objectionable on the grounds that it does not pinpoint the type of mental event that has action as its effect." Sellars thinks that the term 'pro-attitude' does not identify with