The Utility of a Nonconsequentialist Rationale for Civil-Jury-Awarded Punitive Damages
Author(s) -
Paul J. Zwier
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
kansas law review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1942-9258
pISSN - 0083-4025
DOI - 10.17161/1808.19954
Subject(s) - punishment (psychology) , deterrence (psychology) , criminal law , punitive damages , retributive justice , law , doctrine , jury , civil law (civil law) , political science , damages , public law , sociology , economic justice , psychology , social psychology
Jury-awarded punitive damages are a controversial political and social issue. To some, high punitive damage awards are a sign that our civil justice system needs reform. To others, these awards are the key to taming international corporate greed. The justification for punitive damages in civil cases has continued to oscillate between a consequentialist and a nonconsequentialist rationale. This fluctuation in the rationale for punitive damages is nothing new. Since the Reformation, shifts between uses of the law have undergirded civil law in its struggle to replace the unified, hierarchical nature of canon law and to justify itself in both the modern and post-modern eras. This same oscillation in rationales has surfaced concerning punishment in the criminal justice system. The debate concerning the uses of law in moral
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