Open AccessUsing Mechanism Design to Prevent False‐Name Manipulations
Author(s) -
Conitzer Vincent,
Yokoo Makoto
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
ai magazine
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.597
H-Index - 79
eISSN - 2371-9621
pISSN - 0738-4602
DOI - 10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2315
Subject(s) - common value auction , mechanism (biology) , computer science , key (lock) , computer security , identifier , mechanism design , the internet , risk analysis (engineering) , mathematical economics , world wide web , microeconomics , economics , business , epistemology , computer network , philosophy
When mechanisms such as auctions, rating systems, and elections are run in a highly anonymous environment such as the Internet, a key concern is that a single agent can participate multiple times by using false identifiers. Such false‐name manipulations have traditionally not been considered in the theory of mechanism design. In this article, we review recent efforts to extend the theory to address this. We first review results for the basic concept of false‐name‐proofness. Because some of these results are very negative, we also discuss alternative models that allow us to circumvent some of these negative results.