z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
"Justice Breyer, Professor Kahn, and Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Industries"
Author(s) -
Howard Shelanski
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
california law review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.418
H-Index - 53
eISSN - 1942-6542
pISSN - 0008-1221
DOI - 10.15779/z38zq49
Subject(s) - supreme court , economic justice , enforcement , skepticism , consent decree , deregulation , law , competition (biology) , law and economics , political science , economics , philosophy , macroeconomics , biology , epistemology , ecology
In his scholarly writings before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer was skeptical of regulation and supportive of antitrust as a preferable alternative. In this regard Breyer was in express agreement with Professor Alfred Kahn, who championed airline and telecommunications deregulation while advocating antitrust enforcement to promote competition in those industries. It might therefore appear unexpected that Justice Breyer would write the opinion in one case, Credit Suisse v. Billing, and would side with the decision in another, Verizon v. Trinko, to limit antitrust enforcement in regulated industries. This Essay examines the reasoning of Credit Suisse and Trinko. Then, focusing on Breyer’s 1987 California Law Review article and the accompanying commentary by Professor Kahn, it explains why those cases are more predictable than paradoxical in light of Justice Breyer’s earlier scholarly work.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom