Open AccessSupervisory Incentives within Contracts: A Principal-Supervisor-Agent Approach
Author(s) -
KAMALAN A. Eugene
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
journal of finance and bank management
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2333-6072
pISSN - 2333-6064
DOI - 10.15640/jfbm.v6n2a6
Subject(s) - supervisor , incentive , principal (computer security) , principal–agent problem , agency (philosophy) , business , quality (philosophy) , control (management) , moral hazard , selection (genetic algorithm) , actuarial science , marketing , microeconomics , finance , economics , computer science , management , computer security , philosophy , epistemology , artificial intelligence , corporate governance
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom