Fires in P-3 Aircraft Oxygen Systems

Fires in three P3 aircraft oxygen systems have occurred: one in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in 1984 and two in the U .S. Navy in 1998 and 2003. All three fires started in the al uminum manifold and check valve (MCV) assembly and produced similar damages to the aircraft in which they occurred. This paper discusses a failure analysis conducted by the NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) Oxygen Hazards and Testing Team on the 2003 U .S. Navy VP62 fire. It was surmised that the fire started due to heat generated by an oxygen leak past a silicone check valve seal or possibly because of particle impact near the seat of one of the MCV assembly check valves. An add itional analysis of fires in several check valve poppet seals from other aircraft is discussed. These burned poppet seals came from P3 oxygen systems that had been serviced at the Naval Air Station (NAS) in Jacksonville following standard fill procedures. It was concluded that these seal fires occurred due to the heat from compression heating, particle impact, or the heat generated by an oxygen leak past the silicone check valve seal. The fact that catastrophic fires did not occur in the case of each ch eck valve seal fire was attributed to the protective nature of the aluminum oxide layer on the check valve poppets. To prevent future fires of this nature, the U .S. and Canadian fleets of P3 aircraft have been retrofitted with MCV assemblies with an upgr aded design and more burn resistant materials. KEYWORDS: fire, oxygen, aircraft, compression heating, flow friction, particle impact, kindling chain