z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Multi-agent Contracting and Reconfiguration in Competitive Environments using Acquaintance Models
Author(s) -
Jiří Bíba,
Jiří Vokřínek
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
acta polytechnica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.207
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1805-2363
pISSN - 1210-2709
DOI - 10.14311/838
Subject(s) - control reconfiguration , computer science , profit maximization , flexibility (engineering) , profit (economics) , maximization , competitive advantage , computation , simple (philosophy) , distributed computing , industrial organization , business , microeconomics , economics , marketing , embedded system , management , algorithm , philosophy , epistemology
Cooperation of agents in competitive environments is more complicated than in collaborative environments. Both replanning and reconfiguration play a crucial role in cooperation, and introduce a means for implementating a system flexibility. The concepts of commitments, decommitments with penalties and subcontracting may facilitate effective reconfiguration and replanning. Agents in competitive environments are fully autonomous and selfinterested. Therefore the setting of penalties and profit computation cannot be provided centrally. Both the costs and the gain differ from agent to agent with respect to contracts already agreed and resources load. This paper proposes an acquaintance model for contracting in competitive environments and introduces possibilities of reconfigurating in competitive environments as a means of decommitment optimization with respect to resources load and profit maximization. The presented algorithm for contract price setting does not use any centralized knowledge and provides results corresponding to a realistic environment. A simple customerprovider scenario proves this algorithm in competitive contracting.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom