
Risk Sharing Between Competing Health Plans And Sponsors
Author(s) -
Erik M. van Barneveld,
René C.J.A. van Vliet,
Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
health affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.837
H-Index - 178
eISSN - 2694-233X
pISSN - 0278-2715
DOI - 10.1377/hlthaff.20.3.253
Subject(s) - capitation , incentive , payment , business , actuarial science , government (linguistics) , public economics , selection (genetic algorithm) , cost sharing , finance , economics , microeconomics , medicine , computer science , linguistics , nursing , philosophy , artificial intelligence
In many countries, competing health plans receive capitation payments from a sponsor, whether government or a private employer. All capitation payment methods are far from perfect and have raised concerns about risk selection. Paying health plans partly on the basis of capitation and partly on the basis of actual costs ("risk sharing") reduces plans' incentives for selection but sacrifices some incentives for efficiency. This paper summarizes our empirical research on Dutch health plans with respect to various forms of risk sharing. All sponsors can improve their payment systems by either implementing or changing their form of risk sharing.