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Desert One and Its Disorders
Author(s) -
Charles Cogan
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
the journal of military history
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1543-7795
pISSN - 0899-3718
DOI - 10.1353/jmh.2003.0017
Subject(s) - desert (philosophy) , history , medicine , geography , political science , law
Desert One--largely a Special Forces operation--ended in abject failure and cost Jimmy Carter a second term as president. It was not only an organizational failure, due to a splintering of the U.S. armed forces, but a failure of political will and political appreciation. The U.S., confronted virtually for the first time with the new hostile force of Islamic fundamentalism, in the form of a devilish "soft war" scenario put together by Imam Khomeini and his lieutenants, reacted tentatively and with a certain propitiation. When five months later a hostage rescue operation was finally mounted, it was so conceived that the U.S. could call it off at any step along the way. Desert One turned out to be the defining moment that led to a sea-change in American military policy in the 1980s: the spread of the principle of joint operations for the U.S. armed forces (Goldwater-Nichols Act), and the companion Cohen-Nunn Act consolidating Special Forces under a U.S. Special Operations Command.

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