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Although debate persists over the precise extent to which the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has actually changed in recent years, it is clearly evolving.1 Outside of the "near seas," where China is largely perceived as increasingly assertive in its pursuit of core national interests, are Chinese foreign policy approaches becoming more flexible?2 Some related discussions focus on the PRC's voting behavior on UN resolutions involving humanitarian intervention as well as its contributions to international security.3 Its actions in waters abroad have also generated high levels of domestic and international interest, given their connection to Chinese politics, economics, military development, and diplomacy. Yet there is relatively little systematic analysis of whether Chinese foreign policy behavior is becoming more flexible with respect to nontraditional security challenges in the aquatic domain.4 This makes it difficult to address questions about how Beijing's behavior here is related to broader Chinese foreign policy trajectories. Specifically, are Chinese approaches to nontraditional waterborne security indicative of a larger shift in the country's foreign policy toward greater flexibility and idiosyncratic dynamism?This article offers two case studies on Chinese participation in nontraditional waterborne security since 2008: the Gulf of Aden and the Mekong River.5 These cases have presented critical tests for Beijing, not only operationally but also in terms of policy and symbolism. The Gulf of Aden and Mekong River differ fundamentally in their geographic characteristics and proximity to China, China's relative regional position, the degree to which Chinese foreign policy interests are threatened, the nature of China's involvement in operations, and the legal opportunities and constraints. These disparities are precisely why examining the cases together is helpful for understanding Chinese foreign policy trends. China's behavior vis-a-vis these two regions illustrates that Beijing is exploring flexible foreign policy tactics responsive to manifold factors in order to protect its interests. Addressing security challenges in these regions offers China opportunities to protect its economic interests abroad; allows Chinese military, paramilitary, and security forces to accrue experience and improve operationally; enables China to enhance its political image by performing successful missions and engaging in friendly diplomacy with other states before, during, and after operations; and lets China participate meaningfully-if thus far modestly-in the construction of a 21st-century architecture for nontraditional security governance that is commensurate with the country's relative power in a given region. Dynamic approaches to nontraditional waterborne security provide vital flexibility for a Chinese regime facing complex internal and external pressures while the PRC continues its ascent from a developing country to a global power. China will continue to expand the ability of its military and security infrastructure to perform nontraditional waterborne security missions outside China without necessarily altering the core framework of global maritime governance. This development should be welcomed by other states in the maritime commons. Further, while admittedly a small sample, China's security contributions in the Gulf of Aden and Mekong River demonstrate that the country's foreign policy approaches to nontraditional waterborne security are potentially compatible with, rather than inherently threatening to, existing security frameworks.China's international economic, political, and social connections are unprecedented. The PRC relied on foreign trade for just under half of its 2012 GDP.6 People flows are an outgrowth of economic interdependence: over 80 million Chinese citizens now travel abroad annually, a figure that is expected to rise to over 100 million by 2015.7 China's workforce abroad, estimated at over 5 million in 2012 but likely substantially higher, is also expanding rapidly. …

Ripples of Change in Chinese Foreign Policy? Evidence from Recent Approaches to Nontraditional Waterborne Security