From general policy to legal rule: aspirations and limitations of the precautionary principle.
Author(s) -
Gary E. Marchant
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
environmental health perspectives
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.257
H-Index - 282
eISSN - 1552-9924
pISSN - 0091-6765
DOI - 10.1289/ehp.6197
Subject(s) - ambiguity , vagueness , precautionary principle , jurisdiction , law and economics , agency (philosophy) , meaning (existential) , function (biology) , political science , rule of law , business , law , risk analysis (engineering) , economics , epistemology , computer science , politics , philosophy , ecology , artificial intelligence , evolutionary biology , biology , programming language , fuzzy logic
The rapid spread of the precautionary principle (PP) demonstrates the need to explicitly address the role of precaution in environmental decision making. Unfortunately, the PP in its current form is limited by the vagueness of, and variations in, the many formulations of the PP. This ambiguity in the meaning of the PP would not be so serious if the PP were limited to a general aspirational policy, but in every jurisdiction that has adopted the PP it has been transformed rapidly into a binding legal rule. As a legal rule, the ambiguity of the PP results in arbitrary application by regulatory agencies and reviewing courts and limits the capability of reviewing courts to perform their function in overseeing agency actions. To improve the explicit application of precaution, we must go beyond the current form of the PP and attempt to define the factors that weigh in favor of more or less precaution for specific risks.
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