Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory | Zendy

Louis J. Billera | Zendy; David C. Heath | Zendy; Joseph Raanan | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory

Author(s) -

Louis J. Billera,

David C. Heath,

Joseph Raanan

Publication year - 1978

Publication title -

operations research

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 3.797

H-Index - 140

eISSN - 1526-5463

pISSN - 0030-364X

DOI - 10.1287/opre.26.6.956

Subject(s) - computer science , cover (algebra) , game theory , value (mathematics) , operations research , mathematical economics , mathematics , mechanical engineering , machine learning , engineering

We consider the problem of determining rates for a situation in which services are purchased in bulk but have to be paid for by a large number of small users. The desired rates must be \"fair\" and they must cover all costs. The problem is formulated as a non-atomic game and solved by using the value of the game. In addition to the general problem, we present a detailed actual case, together with computational methods and results.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research