Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria | Zendy

Roy Radner | Zendy; Robert W. Rosenthal | Zendy

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Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria

Author(s) -

Roy Radner,

Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication year - 1982

Publication title -

mathematics of operations research

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.619

H-Index - 83

eISSN - 1526-5471

pISSN - 0364-765X

DOI - 10.1287/moor.7.3.401

Subject(s) - mathematics , mathematical economics , private information retrieval , complete information , finite set , strategy , distribution (mathematics) , random variable , variable (mathematics) , mathematical optimization , game theory , statistics , mathematical analysis

In this paper it is proved that in games with a finite number of players and a finite number of moves, if each player observes a private information random variable which has an atomless distribution and is independent of the observations and payoffs of all other players, then the game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium. Examples are presented that illustrate the importance of the assumptions.

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