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Hedge Fund Franchises
Author(s) -
William Fung,
David A. Hsieh,
Narayan Y. Naik,
Melvyn Teo
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
management science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.954
H-Index - 255
eISSN - 1526-5501
pISSN - 0025-1909
DOI - 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3516
Subject(s) - hedge fund , fund of funds , business , alternative beta , finance , global assets under management , spillover effect , incentive , performance fee , revenue , open end fund , product (mathematics) , agency (philosophy) , institutional investor , fund administration , economics , microeconomics , corporate governance , market liquidity , philosophy , geometry , mathematics , epistemology
We investigate the growth strategies of hedge fund firms. We find that firms with successful first funds are able to launch follow-on funds that charge higher performance fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and attract greater inflows. Motivated by the aforementioned spillover effects, first funds outperform follow-on funds, after adjusting for risk. Consistent with the agency view, greater incentive alignment moderates the performance differential between first and follow-on funds. Moreover, multiple-product firms underperform single-product firms but harvest greater fee revenues, thereby hurting investors while benefitting firm partners. Investors respond to this growth strategy by redeeming from first funds of firms with follow-on funds that do poorly. Empirically, the multiple-product firm has become the dominant business model for the hedge fund industry.

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