Open AccessPersuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation
Author(s) -
Florian Hoffmann,
Roman Inderst,
Marco Ottaviani
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
management science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.954
H-Index - 255
eISSN - 1526-5501
pISSN - 0025-1909
DOI - 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3455
Subject(s) - persuasion , competition (biology) , normative , business , consumer welfare , cheap talk , politics , internet privacy , economics , welfare , microeconomics , advertising , marketing , social psychology , psychology , computer science , law , political science , ecology , market economy , biology
This paper models how firms or political campaigners (senders) persuade consumers and voters (receivers) by selectively disclosing information about their offering depending on individual receivers...
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