Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union | Zendy

Elena Carletti | Zendy; Giovanni Dell’Ariccia | Zendy; Robert Marquez | Zendy

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Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union

Author(s) -

Elena Carletti,

Giovanni Dell’Ariccia,

Robert Marquez

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

management science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.954

H-Index - 255

eISSN - 1526-5501

pISSN - 0025-1909

DOI - 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3448

Subject(s) - supervisor , incentive , agency (philosophy) , divergence (linguistics) , principal–agent problem , business , principal (computer security) , intervention (counseling) , central bank , bridge (graph theory) , compliance (psychology) , finance , economics , accounting , industrial organization , microeconomics , monetary economics , computer science , corporate governance , management , monetary policy , computer security , medicine , psychology , philosophy , linguistics , social psychology , epistemology , psychiatry

We explore the behavior of supervisors in a “hub-and-spokes”regime: one in which a supranational agency has legal power over all decisions regarding banks, but has to rely on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act. This institutional design entails a principal-agent problem between the

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