Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs | Zendy

Ola Kvaløy | Zendy; Trond E. Olsen | Zendy

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Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs

Author(s) -

Ola Kvaløy,

Trond E. Olsen

Publication year - 2019

Publication title -

management science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 4.954

H-Index - 255

eISSN - 1526-5501

pISSN - 0025-1909

DOI - 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3162

Subject(s) - aggregate (composite) , variance (accounting) , tournament , incentive , set (abstract data type) , measure (data warehouse) , scheme (mathematics) , principal–agent problem , computer science , econometrics , correlation , economics , mathematics , microeconomics , mathematical optimization , data mining , mathematical analysis , corporate governance , materials science , finance , combinatorics , programming language , composite material , geometry , accounting

We analyze relational contracts between a principal and a set of risk-neutral agents whose outputs are correlated. When only the agents’ aggregate output can be observed, a team incentive scheme is...

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