Open AccessObscured Transparency? Compensation Benchmarking and the Biasing of Executive Pay
Author(s) -
Mathijs de Vaan,
Benjamin Elbers,
Thomas A. DiPrete
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
management science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.954
H-Index - 255
eISSN - 1526-5501
pISSN - 0025-1909
DOI - 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3151
Subject(s) - executive compensation , incentive , transparency (behavior) , discretion , business , leverage (statistics) , compensation (psychology) , accounting , peer group , selection bias , microeconomics , economics , psychology , social psychology , political science , computer science , machine learning , law , medicine , pathology
The disclosure of compensation peer groups is argued to provide shareholders with valuable information that can be used to scrutinize chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. However, research s...
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